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Recent studies have shown that the current primitives for connect-
ing multiple routing protocol instances (OSPF 1, OSPF 2, EIGRP
10, etc.) are pervasively deployed in enterprise networks and the
Internet. Furthermore, these primitives are extremely vulnerable to
routing anomalies (route oscillations, forwarding loops, etc.) and
at the same time too rigid to support some of today’s operational
objectives. In this paper, we propose a new theory to reason about
routing properties across multiple routing instances. The theory di-
rectly applies to both link-state and vector routing protocols. Each
routing protocol still makes independent routing decisions and may
consider a combination of routing metrics, including bandwidth,
delay, cost, and reliability. While the theory permits a range of so-
lutions, we focus on a design that requires no changes to existing
routing protocols. Guided by the theory, we derive a new set of
connecting primitives, which are not only provably safe but also
more expressive than the current version. We have implemented
and validated the new primitives using XORP. The results confirm
that our design can support a large range of desirable operational
goals, including those not achievable today, safely and with little
manual configuration.
Categories and Subject Descriptors:
C.2.6 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Internetworking
General Terms: Design, Theory
Keywords: Connecting primitives, route redistribution, route se-
lection
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent empirical studies [24, 21, 5] challenge the traditional,
simple “BGP over your favorite IGP” view of the Internet routing
architecture. As illustrated in Figure 1, they reveal that the Inter-
net routing landscape is in reality much more complex. ISPs and
enterprise networks deploy tens to hundreds of routing protocol in-
stances simultaneously [21, 5], and those routing instances are of-
tentimes interconnected in diverse ways [24]. In a recent study [5],
the authors found that 57% of the analyzed networks have more
than three routing instances, which is greater than a single IGP and
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EGP, and discovered both enterprise and university networks with
more than ten instances. Former studies [21, 24] have also con-
firmed the prevalance of routing instances and exposed networks
with even hundreds of routing instances. There are several reasons
for these sophisticated routing designs: the need to route traffic
based on metrics other than hop count, the desire for autonomy
between departments of a same company [21], the requirement to
filter route announcements [8], scalabity [21] and economical rea-
sons [5].
It has been observed that the connecting primitives, which run
on the border routers (e.g., A and B in Figure 1) and govern the
interactions between the routing protocol instances, play critical
roles in implementing the sophisticated routing designs. Even in
the simplest “BGP over IGP” scenarios, those primtives are ac-
tually required to inject IGP or static routes into BGP. More im-
portantly, operators use them to not simply interconnect routing
protocol instances but also achieve critical design objectives (e.g.,
domain backup, shortest path routing across instances) that are in-
feasible using routing protocols (e.g., BGP) alone [21].
Currently, the primitives responsible for interconnecting routing
instances consist of the so-called route selection and route redistri-
bution procedures [9, 8]. Consider routers A and B in Figure 1.
They are border routers in the sense that they belong to multiple
routing protocol instances at the same time. Router A belongs to
three routing protocol instances (BGP, OSPF 100, and RIP) and
runs a separate routing process for each of them. In contrast, router
B is a member of two different OSPF instances. When a bor-
der router (e.g., A) receives routes, to the same destination pre-
fix, from multiple routing processes (e.g., BGP, OSPF 100, RIP),
the border router cannot directly compare the routes as each rout-
ing instance typically has its own metrics. For example, RIP re-
lies on a hop-count, whereas OSPF routes have a type (intra-area,
inter-area, external type 1, external type 2) and a cost. The border
router uses the route selection procedure to rank routes received
from different routing processes and to determine which one to in-
stall in its forwarding table. As for route redistribution, this proce-
dure is required to exchange routing information between routing
instances. By default, routing processes of different protocol in-
stances do not exchange routing information even though they are
on the same border router. Route redistribution must be explicitly
enabled through router configuration. For example, the OSPF 200
and OSPF 300 instances will not exchange routes unless route re-
distribution between the two instances is configured on router B.
Current operational networks rely heavily on these two procedures.
A recent study [21] analyzed the usage of route redistribution in
more than 1600 networks, and revealed that 99.9% of them depend
on it.































Figure 1: A typical slice of Internet routing landscape. Though abstracted, it still shows formidable complexity.
tives, it has been shown that the current mechanisms are extremely
prone to misconfigurations [20, 22] and such errors are likely the
root causes of many reported forwarding loops, route oscillations,
prefix hijacks, and non-deterministic path problems [23]. In re-
sponse, several analytical models [20, 22, 23] have been developed
enabling rigorous analyses of the current route selection and route
redistribution procedures, and the formulation of practical config-
uration guidelines. However, adding band-aids to current mecha-
nisms presents severe limitations. Configuration guidelines intro-
duce new restrictions on setting parameters and, therefore, reduce
the flexibility of the primitives and their power to implement oper-
ational goals. Operators have reported that the current primitives,
even without any restriction, are already too rigid to support some
desirable routing policies [21]. The existing analytical models are
too tied to the current mechanisms and as such, do not provide in-
sights for new designs.
We believe that the Internet will remain a myriad of routing pro-
tocol instances and that the primitives responsible for connecting
different routing protocol instances will continue to play a cru-
cial role in the Internet routing architecture. One single routing
instance is unlikely to satisfy all operational requirements. The
driving forces behind the current prevalence of routing protocol in-
stances, including the distinction between IGP and EGP function-
ality, the requirement to route traffic based on different metrics, and
the desire for autonomy between sites branches or departments, are
likely to persist. In fact, the number of routing protocol instances
may even grow with the emergence of new technologies (e.g., wire-
less networks, ad-hoc networks, vehicular networks, sensor net-
works, etc.) as each of them presents unique characteristics and
may require distinct routing protocols. In this context, operators
need a safe way to connect routing instances.
This situation brings up a fundamental open question: Can we
design a set of connecting primitives that both guarantee routing
correctness (i.e., always converge to loop-free forwarding paths re-
gardless of how they are configured) and increase the offered de-
gree of expressiveness allowing operators to fulfill their require-
ments? To answer the question, we need a theory to reason about
routing across multiple routing protocol instances.
In this paper, we present such a theory for reasoning about rout-
ing correctness in networks with multiple interconnected routing
instances. From the theory, we then derive a new set of primitives
to connect routing protocol instances. While the theory permits a
wide range of design options, we focus on a design characterized by
no changes to existing routing protocols. We implemented the new
primitives in XORP routing software [3]. The results confirm that
our proposed design allows operators to safely implement a large
range of desirable design objectives, including those not feasible
today. Our contributions are three-fold:
1. We have developed a new formal framework to reason about
routing properties in networks with multiple interconnected rout-
ing protocol instances. By adding the formalism of conversion
functions to the theory of routing algebras, we are able to ab-
stract the functional requirements of connecting routing proto-
col instances. The framework is able to model the current route
selection and route redistribution procedures and also provide
insights for a clean slate design of these mechanisms. The key
result is a set of sufficient conditions for guaranteeing safe rout-
ing, and optimal paths, across multiple routing instances.
2. Guided by the new theory, we have created a new design of con-
necting primitives. In contrast to the current approach, our de-
sign guarantees routing safety regardless of configuration errors
and, moreover, supports a large range of operational goals. The
solution is desirable and feasible for many networks, including
individual ISP networks, and large enterprise networks. To de-
ploy the new primitives likely requires router software upgrade.
However, no modification to any of the existing routing proto-
cols is necessary. As such, the scope of router software upgrade
will be limited to a relatively small number of border routers.
3. We have implemented the new primitives into XORP and con-
ducted experiments to validate the ability of these primitives to
support several design goals considered important by the oper-
ational community. The results are encouraging. While some
of the goals are not feasible today, our implementation show the
new primitives are able to support them without requiring elab-
orate configurations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
a brief description of the existing route selection and route redistri-
bution procedures. Section 3 presents the newly proposed theory
to reason about routing across multiple routing protocol instances.
Section 4 identifies sufficient conditions to guarantee correct rout-
ing and optimal paths across routing protocol instances. From the
theory, Section 5 derives new primitives. Section 6 presents our im-
plementation. Section 7 illustrates the expressiveness of the design.
Section 8 presents related work, and finally, Section 9 discusses fu-
ture work.
2. BACKGROUND: CURRENT PRIMITIVES
This section briefly describes the current implementation of the
two primitives, namely route selection and route redistribution, that
govern the interactions between routing protocol instances. It should
be noted that all discussions in the paper are with respect to a single
destination prefix, denoted by P , unless noted otherwise.
1 interface ethernet 0
2 ip address 192.1.1.1 255.255.255.0
3 !
4 interface ethernet 1






11 router ospf 100
12 network 192.1.2.0 255.255.255.0 area 0.0.0.0
13 default-metric 100
14 redistribute rip metric 200 metric-type 1 subnets
15 !
Figure 2: Excerpt of a router configuration file illustrating the
current IOS commands for route selection and route redistri-
bution.
Route selection: A router that runs multiple instances of different
routing protocols (EIGRP, BGP, OSPF, etc.) or multiple instances
of a same routing protocol (e.g., OSPF 100, OSPF 200, etc.) creates
a separate routing process for each of them. In the rest of this paper,
we will more formally say that two routing processes belong to the
same routing protocol instance when the two processes are each
on a different router, run the same routing protocol and exchange
routing information through it.
For the destination prefix P , each routing process selects one
best route, from both the received updates and the local informa-
tion, using a protocol specific algorithm: E.g., RIP simply com-
pares the hop count while BGP uses an elaborate path ranking pro-
cedure. Then, if more than one routing process offer[s] a route
to P , the router must perform a route selection procedure to de-
termine which one to install in the Forwarding Information Base
(FIB). This decision is currently based on a configurable parameter
called Administrative Distance (AD) [9], with the preference given
to the route with the lowest AD value. By default, in Cisco routers,
RIP processes have an AD of 120 whereas OSPF processes have
an AD of 110. As such, unless the AD values are overridden, when
receiving both a RIP route and an OSPF route to the same destina-
tion prefix, a router prefers and installs the OSPF route in its FIB.
Route redistribution: Route redistribution allows operators to ex-
change routing information across routing instances. One compli-
cation is that routing protocols use different types of routing met-
rics. For example, RIP uses a single metric (hop count) while
EIGRP relies on a weighted sum of bandwidth, delay, reliability,
and load. The current route redistribution procedure handles this
incompatibility in a crude fashion. It resets the metric of a redis-
tributed route to either a constant default value or a fixed value
manually configured by the operator. In either case, the new metric
values typically have no relation to the route’s original metric val-
ues.
Configuration commands: Each router vendor has its own con-
figuration language. We focus on the Cisco IOS commands for
illustration purposes. The syntax may differ across router vendors
but the functions remain similar. Currently, configuring route selec-
tion and route redistribution on Cisco routers mainly involves three
IOS commands. Each command allows a number of variants and
options. Figure 2 illustrates an example use of these commands.
The router has two interfaces, and runs two routing processes: RIP
on the first interface, and OSPF on the second one.
1. The distance command (line 9) allows operators to override
the default administrative distance of a routing process. In the
depicted example, the administrative distance of RIP is set to
100, which is lower than the default administrative distance value
of OSPF (110). Consequently, when receiving routes to the
same destination from both RIP and OSPF, the router will se-
lect the RIP route.
2. The redistribute command (line 14) inside the OSPF com-
mand block activates route redistribution from RIP into the OSPF
process. When configuring BGP, one may also use the network
command to activate redistribution from any source (e.g., static,
RIP, etc.) into BGP. Route filters can be applied to a redistribute
or BGP network command to restrict the redistribution to a
specific subset of routes. The redistribute command has
protocol-specific options. For example, in the depicted exam-
ple, the metric-type command is specific to OSPF, which
mandates the routes to be advertised as “external type 1”. A
route can be injected into OSPF as either an external type 1 or
an external type 2 route. The two types differ in the way their
costs will be calculated as they propagate inside the OSPF rout-
ing instance. The cost of a type 1 route will be dynamic, with
the costs of the internal links added to the metric value assigned
at the time of redistribution. In contrast, the cost of a type 2
route remains fixed regardless how many internal links it con-
tains. In addition, a type 1 route is always preferred to a type 2
route.
3. The default-metric command (line 13) allows operators to
configure a new default metric value for all route redistributions
to a routing process. In addition, the metric option (line 14)
may be used to override this default metric value for redistribu-
tion from a particular source. In the example, routes from the
RIP routing process are injected into the OSPF process with an
initial OSPF cost of 200 instead of the default value of 100.
In summary, the AD parameter (in route selection) and the met-
rics of newly redistributed routes (for route redistribution) are mainly
set to arbitrary constant values, independently of the route’s origi-
nal attributes. As a result, information related to the initial routes
(e.g., relative preference) may be lost potentially leading to persis-
tent forwarding loops, permanent route oscillations and other unac-
ceptable outcomes [22, 23].
3. A THEORY FOR MULTI-INSTANCE
ROUTING
Although a considerable body of research has been devoted to
the correctness of routing, most prior work concentrated on the be-
haviors of one specific routing protocol (e.g., RIP, OSPF, or BGP)
at a time. In contrast, this section presents a general framework to
study routing properties across multiple routing protocol instances.
Inspired by the seminal work of Griffin and Sobrinho on Metarout-
ing [28, 29, 17], the proposed theory models routing protocols as
algebras. Such an abstraction allows us to leave out the myriad of
algorithmic details of different routing protocols and focus on cru-
cial correctness requirements such as convergence and loop free-
dom. Furthermore, general results which are applicable to both
existing and future routing protocols may be obtained from the the-
ory.
Section 3.1 provides a brief overview of the most relevant results
on routing algebras. Then, Section 3.2 introduces the new notion
of conversion functions to model the interactions between routing
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Figure 3: Illustration of similarity between (a) “classic” short-
est path, and (b) routing algebra.
3.1 Background: Routing algebras
Routing algebras can be viewed as an abstraction and general-
ization of shortest path routing [7, 13, 15, 14, 17]. As illustrated
in Figure 3 [17], each route has a signature (σ ∈ Σ) to model its
relative precedence, and the notion of link weights is generalized
to policy labels. When a route with signature σ is extended over a
link (“u - v” in this example), with policy label λ ∈ L, the route’s
new signature becomes (λ ⊕ σ) ∈ Σ. In other words, a signature
represents the set of a route’s attributes, a label represents the set of
routing policies when a route is propagated over a given link, and
⊕ symbolizes the application of the routing policies to a route.
More formally, an algebraA is defined by a tuple (L, Σ, φ,⊕,)
[28, 29, 17] with φ being a special signature indicating a prohibited
path. ⊕ is a mapping from L× Σ into Σ. The relation  is called
a preference relation and creates a total pre-order over Σ. It allows
routers to rank routes from A: If two routes have signatures α and
β, (α, β ∈ Σ) and α  β, the route with signature α is preferred to
the one with signature β. If α  β and β  α, then we say that α
and β are equally prefered (noted α ∼ β). Prohibited paths – paths
with signature φ – are not further extended and ∀σ ∈ Σ \ {φ},
σ ≺ φ.
The relation , being a total pre-order over Σ, satisfies the fol-
lowing properties:
(Reflexivity) ∀σ ∈ Σ, σ  σ.
(Transitivity) ∀σ1, σ2, σ3 ∈ Σ,
if σ1  σ2 and σ2  σ3, then σ1  σ3.
(Totality) ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ, σ1  σ2 or σ2  σ1.
The relation  is not necessarily antisymmetric, i.e., for σ1, σ2 in
Σ, σ1  σ2 and σ2  σ1 do not imply σ1 = σ2. This relaxation
allows us to enlargen the scope of covered routing protocols. In par-
ticular, the framework can include path vectoring routing protocols.
To illustrate it, we assume that a signature σ consists of a sequence
of identifiers (e.g., router identifiers or BGP Autonomous System
Numbers), and σ1  σ2 if σ1 has a shorter sequence of identifiers
than σ2: For example, (27, 36, 45)  (117, 234, 54, 810). We note
that (10, 20, 30)  (50, 30, 80) and (50, 30, 80)  (10, 20, 30) but
(10, 20, 30) 6= (50, 30, 80). This operation is similar to the BGP
AS PATH.
To serve as an example of a routing algebra, the RIP routing
protocol can be modeled by the following one: L = {1, 2, . . . ,
16}, Σ = {1, 2, . . . , 16}, φ = 16, “” = “≤”, and ⊕ defined as
λ ⊕ σ = min(λ + σ, φ). Each hop in a path is assigned a config-
urable hop count which can take any value from 1 to 16. When a
router receives a routing update, it adds its hop count to the metric
value, and routes with hop count of 16 or more are prohibited and
not propagated. In this specific case, L = Σ. However, this may
not always be the case. As another example of routing algebras,
SM I ⊕ is assoc.
Vectoring X
Link-state with Dijkstra’s alg. X X X
Table 1: Sufficient conditions for correctness of routing.
a routing protocol that selects the path with maximum available
bandwidth can be modeled with (⊕, ) = (min, ≥).
We consider m routing instances {1, . . . ,m}. We denote r.i
the routing process of routing instance i hosted at router r. Each
routing instance i is represented by a distinct finite algebra Ai =
(Li,Σi, φi,⊕i,i). We model each adjacency between two routers
by a distinct edge between them. In the rest of this paper, we may
loosely use the terms routing algebras, routing instances and rout-
ing processes interchangeably depending on the context.
Previous papers by Sobrinho [28, 29] have identified sufficient
conditions for routing correctness for both vectoring and link state
routing protocols. These properties are summarized in Table 1 [17].
First, a routing algebra Ai satisfies the Strict Monotonicity (or sim-
ply SM) property if the following condition holds:
(SM) ∀l ∈ Li, ∀σ ∈ Σi \ {φi}, σ ≺i (l ⊕i σ).
Simply put, SM requires that the preference of any route strictly
decreases each time it is propagated by a router. SM by itself is
a sufficient condition for routing correctness for a vectoring proto-
col [29]. For link-state protocols, additional properties are needed.
In particular, a routing algebra Ai satisfies the isotonicity (I) prop-
erty1 if both of the following conditions hold:
(Left-Isotonicity) ∀l ∈ Li, ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σi,
if σ1 i σ2, then l ⊕i σ1 i l ⊕i σ2.
(Right-Isotonicity) ∀σ1, σ2, σ3 ∈ Σi,
if σ1 i σ2, then σ1 ⊕i σ3 i σ2 ⊕i σ3.
Isotonicity means that the preference order between two routes
is preserved when they both are prepended by, or extended over,
a common link. As shown in Table 1, both I and SM are needed
to ensure the correctness of a link-state protocol. In addition, left-
isotonicity is a sufficient condition to guarantee optimal paths for
vectoring routing algebras, and a stronger condition of full iso-
tonicity is sufficient for link-state algebras to have the same prop-
erty [28].
Prior work used this elegant framework to analyze BGP and de-
sign new routing protocols through composition of routing algebras
that are simple and conform to the sufficient conditions for correct-
ness. However, the framework only applies to a network with a
single routing protocol instance, i.e., every router in that network
must run a single, identical routing protocol. The next section ex-
tends the framework to routing across multiple routing instances.
3.2 Conversion functions
We observe that at the heart of inter-routing-process route selec-
tion and route redistribution procedures are two types of necessary
routing metric conversions. For route selection, metric conversions
are required to establish a common ground to compare routes from
different routing processes. For route redistribution, metric con-
versions are effectively performed when assigning metric values
to redistributed routes in the target routing processes. For exam-
ple, the current route redistribution procedure resets the metrics of
newly redistributed routes to constant values, either by default or
as specified by operators. Such redistribution can be represented
by constant conversion functions.
1We adopt the terminology proposed in [28, 29] herein. Other
works have used the terms monotonicity and nondecreasing in
place of isotonicity and monotonicity, respectively.
Σi
Φi−>0 () Φ0−>i ()
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Σ2Σ1 Σn...      ...
Figure 4: Illustration of the relations between the individual
routing instance signature spaces {Σ1, Σ2, ..., Σm} and the uni-
versal metric space Σ0.
Therefore, we propose to extend the routing algebra framework
as follows. We treat each routing instance as a separate routing al-
gebra, and model the interactions between these routing protocol
instances with a set of metric conversion functions between rout-
ing algebras. To be more scalable, we conceptualize the metric
conversions between routing algebras as indirect, via a hypotheti-
cal common algebra with a universal metric (signature) space, as
shown in Figure 4. We define the connections between each alge-
bra Ai and the common algebra with a pair of conversion functions
Φi→0() and Φ0→i().
To illustrate the utility of these conversion functions in com-
paring routes from different routing instances, consider a router
r that receives routes through k distinct routing processes (r.1,
r.2, ... r.k). (See Figure 5.) Each routing process r.i selects
its best route according to a routing process specific ranking al-
gorithm, and presents its most preferred route to the inter-routing
process route selection algorithm. We note σi the signature of the
best route from routing process r.i. The signatures of these best
routes (σ1, σ2, ..., σk ) presented by the k routing processes be-
long to different signature domains, and as such, cannot be directly
compared. They must first be converted, through the conversion
functions Φ1→0(), Φ2→0(),..., Φk→0(), into the common univer-
sal metric space. Then, with the signatures being in the same unit,
a best route among all the presented routes can be selected and
installed in the router’s Forwarding Information Base (FIB) for for-
warding purposes.
Each routing instance i may connect with other routing instances
via multiple border routers. In the general case, a routing instance
may use different conversion functions at different border routers.
For example, the current inter-routing-process route selection pro-
cedure allows operators to override the default administrative dis-
tances of the routing processes for each router. To represent this
per-router behavior, we make the router r an argument of the con-
version function Φi→0(). As such, Φi→0() maps elements fromR
× Σi into Σ0 where R represents the set of border routers in the
network, and Σ0 the universal metric space.
To further motivate the use of conversion functions to abstract
the exchange of routing information across routing instances, con-
sider Figure 6 where a route is propagated from router A to B, then
to C, and finally back to A. Observe that there are two types of
route propagation: (1) routes may be propagated between routing
processes of a same routing instance, and (2) routes may be re-
distributed between different routing processes (and thus different
routing instances) on a same router.
(1) Route propagation within each routing instance i can be fully
modeled by the routing algebra operators (i.e., ⊕i) for the rout-
ing instance [17]. In Figure 6, when B.RIP receives a route
from A.RIP with hop-count σ1, and B.RIP re-advertises the
route over the link with weight of λ2, the route has a new signa-
ture σ2 = λ2 ⊕RIP σ1 = λ2 + σ1.
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Updates from peer processes
Forwarding Information Base
Figure 5: Ranking of routes received from different routing
instances at a router. Each instance’s process selects its most
preferred route using an instance specific ranking algorithm
and offers only its best route to the inter-routing-process route
selection, which must rely on the conversion functions to map
the signatures of all offered routes into a common metric space
before ranking them.
suppose that the RIP route with signature σ2(∈ ΣRIP ) is re-
distributed from the RIP routing process into the EIGRP rout-
ing process at the border router C. The operation ⊕EIGRP will
define the signature while the route is being advertised in the
EIGRP routing instance. However, while ⊕EIGRP maps ele-
ments of LEIGRP ×ΣEIGRP into ΣEIGRP , σ2 is from ΣRIP .
We need to convert the signature from ΣRIP into ΣEIGRP
through the application of two conversion functions:
Φ0→EIGRP (r,ΦRIP→0(r, σ2)). As such, the propagation of
routes between routing instances at a border router can be seen
as over a virtual inter-routing-process link labeled with conver-
sion functions, and the new signature is well defined.
More formally, let A0 = (L0,Σ0, φ0,⊕0,0) denote the com-
mon algebra, where Σ0 represents the domain of signatures in the
universal metric space, and the relation 0 is a total pre-order
over Σ0. For brevity, let L = L1 ∪ L2 ∪ ... ∪ Lm, and Σ =
Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ ... ∪ Σm.
Definition 1: Each algebra Ai (i ∈ [1,m]) is associated with two
conversion functions:
1) Φi→0(): R × Σi → Σ0
2) Φ0→i(): R × Σ0 → Σi
Definition 2: The binary relation r over Σ is defined as:
∀ r ∈ R, ∀α, β ∈ Σ,
∃i, j ∈ [1,m] such that α ∈ Σi, β ∈ Σj , then
α r β def=
{
α i β if i = j
Φi→0(r, α) 0 Φj→0(r, β) else
The relation r allows router r to rank any set of routes. If two
candidate routes are from the same routing process (r.i), the rout-
ing instance specific best path selection algorithm (i) determines
the best route. If routes are from different routing processes, their
signatures are first converted into the universal metric space using
their respective conversion functions, and the total pre-order 0
over Σ0 defines their ranking at router r.
Definition 3: The operator ⊕r : L× Σ→ Σ is defined as:
∀ r ∈ R, ∀λ ∈ L, ∀σ ∈ Σ,





















































Figure 6: Propagation of routes: A route can be propagated
within the same routing instance, or into a different routing
instance at a border router (e.g., C in this figure).
λ⊕r σ def=
{
λ⊕j σ if i = j
λ⊕j Φ0→j(r,Φi→0(r, σ)) else
The operator ⊕r specifies the signature of a route further prop-
agated by router r. If a route is further propagated in the same
routing instance, the new signature is determined as λ⊕j σ as pre-
viously shown [17]. If the route is redistributed into a different
routing instance, the initial signature must first be converted into
a signature of the target routing instance, before the operation ⊕j
can be applied.
We note that today’s route selection and route redistribution pro-
cedures, as described in Section 2, can be modeled by constant
conversion functions as follows.
• A two dimensional universal metric space Σ0 = [1, . . . , 255] ×
[1, . . . ,m], where the first dimension models the AD value space
and the second an enumeration of all the routing instances in the
network.
• 0 defined as ∀(x, i), (y, j) ∈ Σ0, (x, i) 0 (y, j) if and only if
x ≤ y (with ≤ being the standard ordering between integers).
• ∀σ = (255, i) ∈ Σ0, σ = φ0, i.e., prohibited path.
• ∀i ∈ [1,m], ∀r ∈ R, ∀σ ∈ Σi: Φi→0(r, σ) = (AD(r, i), i),
where AD(r, i) represents the default or configured administrative
distance for r.i.
• ∀j ∈ [1,m], ∀r ∈ R, ∀σ = (x, i) ∈ Σ0:
Φ0→j(r, σ) = metric(r, i, j), where metric(r, i, j) is the default
or configured constant metric assigned to routes redistributed from
r.i into r.j.
This model permits us to predict – given a fixed set of input
routes – the forwarding state at a router with the current design.
However, the model is limited in its ability to infer end-to-end for-
warding paths without additional non-trivial work to take into con-
sideration the timing of route propagation (and possibly race con-
ditions) and incomplete knowledge of external routes. Fortunately,
as detailed in the next section, this framework allows us to identify
sufficient conditions for network-wide routing safety based on only
conversion function definitions per routing instance.
4. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
The previous section introduced the notion of conversion func-
tions to model and reason about the properties of the connecting
primitives. Under this framework, the initial question on whether
we can design safer and more expressive primitives hinges on the
D
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Figure 7: Modes of redistribution: Routes can be redistributed
in either (1) a vectoring or (2) a link-state mode between differ-
ent instances.
following question: Are there conditions that are sufficient for the
conversion functions to guarantee routing safety? The answer is
positive and this section presents a set of such conditions. The dis-
cussion is focused on a special case where for each routing instance,
the conversion functions are identical across its border routers. For-
mally, ∀r1, r2 ∈ R, ∀i ∈ [1,m],
∀σ ∈ Σi, Φi→0(r1, σ) = Φi→0(r2, σ), and
∀σ ∈ Σ0, Φ0→i(r1, σ) = Φ0→i(r2, σ).
Consequently, ⊕r and r are the same across all routers. Thus,
in the rest of of the paper, we simplify the notation by removing
the argument r from the conversion functions, and the superscript
from the operators.
For ease of exposition, the discussion is divided into two parts:
first for unary routing algebras and then for the more general case
of n-ary lexicographic products of sub-algebras. We define unary
algebras as algebras that use a single attribute to determine their
best path. An example is the RIP protocol which selects the route
with the lowest hop count. In contrast, n-ary lexicographic prod-
ucts of sub-algebras perform a lexicographic comparison of up to
n attributes. For example, the BGP best path selection algorithm is
based on a lexicographic ordering of the local-preference, the AS-
PATH length, the origin type, and other additional attributes. For
brevity, we only present the results for unary algebras in detail.
4.1 Two modes of route redistribution
The current route redistribution procedure injects a route into a
new routing instance in a vectoring mode because the new rout-
ing information mainly consists of the destination prefix and some
metrics (to rank routes). Theoretically, the exchange of routing in-
formation between routing instances can also be performed in a
link-state manner whereby one routing instance passes on its entire
link state database to another routing instance at a border router.
In fact, this mode has an advantage over the current approach as
demonstrated in the following example. Consider the network de-
picted in Figure 7 which consists of two instances of OSPF (OSPF
100, OSPF 200). Suppose the border routers (D, E) are configured
to redistribute routes from OSPF 200 into OSPF 100. Let us focus
on a subnet with prefix P connected to router G. When routers in
the OSPF 100 instance (e.g., A) run Dijkstra’s algorithm, they will
not have a complete view of the entire network topology with the
current design; instead, they only see two possible egress routers
(D, E) to reach P , knowing little about the subpaths inside OSPF
200. In contrast, if the route redistribution were performed in a
link-state mode, routers in OPSF 100 would have a complete view
of the topology across both OSPF instances and thus be able to find
end-to-end disjoint paths, to P .
Intuitively, for the vectoring mode, the key property to preserve
in order to guarantee convergence and loop-free forwarding paths
is SM. For the link-state mode, additional properties are required
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Figure 8: Illustration of Condition 1.
4.2 Safety condition for vectoring mode
Condition 1: ∀i ∈ [1,m],
(a) Φi→0 : Σi → Σ0 is strictly increasing, i.e.,
∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σi, σ1 ≺i σ2 ⇒ Φi→0(σ1) ≺0 Φi→0(σ2)
(b) ∀σ ∈ Σ0, σ 0 Φi→0 ◦ Φ0→i(σ)
where Φi→0 ◦ Φ0→i(σ) = Φi→0(Φ0→i(σ))
This condition stipulates that the conversion function Φi→0()
maps distinct signatures of Σi into distinct values of Σ0 in an or-
der preserving manner (Condition 1a). In addition, the preference
of a route should not decrease as it is redistributed (Condition 1b).
Figure 8 illustrates the above conditions: The pair of conversion
functions (Φi→0(), Φ0→i()) satisfies Condition 1.
Lemma 1: Condition 1 guarantees that the relation  is a total
pre-order over the set of signatures Σ.
To prove Lemma 1, we need to show the relation  is reflexive,
transitive, and total. For brevity, we omit the details of the proof.
Theorem 1: If all algebras A1, A2, ..., Am are SM, then Condition
1 is a sufficient condition to guarantee the preservation of the SM
property within and across the algebras, i.e., ∀λ ∈ L, ∀σ ∈ Σ,
σ ≺ (λ⊕ σ), and thus guarantees routing safety.
PROOF. To demonstrate that Condition 1 is a sufficient condi-
tion to preserve SM across the algebras, we assume a router re-
ceiving a route with signature σ, and we assume that the route is
extended to an arc with a label λ. We show that assuming that
all algebras A1, A2, ..., Am are SM, and that the conversion func-
tions are compliant with Condition 1, then the extended route has a
strictly lower preference than the initial route.
First, because σ ∈ Σ, and λ ∈ L, there exists i, j ∈ [1,m] such
that σ ∈ Σi and λ ∈ Lj . We then distinguish two cases:
Case 1: i = j. The initial route is extended into the same routing
algebra Ai. Then, since Ai is SM, we conclude that σ ≺i λ ⊕i σ,
i.e., σ ≺ λ⊕ σ (according to Definitions 2 and 3).
Case 2: i 6= j. The initial route from Ai is extended into a different
algebraAj . SinceAj is SM, when the signature Φ0→j◦Φi→0(σ) is
extended over the arc with label λ, its preference stricly decreases:
Φ0→j ◦ Φi→0(σ) ≺j λ⊕j Φ0→j ◦ Φi→0(σ)
Then, by Condition 1(a),
Φj→0 ◦ Φ0→j ◦ Φi→0(σ) ≺0 Φj→0(λ⊕j Φ0→j ◦ Φi→0(σ))
From Condition 1(b), we also have
Φi→0(σ) 0 Φj→0 ◦ Φ0→j ◦ Φi→0(σ)
Since 0 is transitive, from the two above inequations
Φi→0(σ) ≺0 Φj→0(λ⊕j Φ0→j ◦ Φi→0(σ))
By definition of ⊕, we get
Φi→0(σ) ≺0 Φj→0(λ⊕ σ)
Finally, by definition of , we conclude
σ ≺ λ⊕ σ
Theorem 1 is an important result as it may allow us to classify
certain conversion functions as safer than others. For example, it
is straightforward to show that the constant conversion functions
listed in Section 3.2 for modeling the current connecting primitives
do not satisfy Condition 1. More important, this type of sufficient
condition may guide us to design better connecting primitives.
We note that although we conceptualized the redistribution of
a route as propagating the route over a virtual link in the previous
section, route redistribution does not need to be SM. This is because
the redistributed route is not eligible to be installed in the local
FIB [22, 23].
4.3 Optimality condition for vectoring mode
Condition 2: ∀i ∈ [1,m],Φ0→i : Σ0 → Σi is increasing, i.e.,
∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ0, σ1 0 σ2 ⇒ Φ0→i(σ1) i Φ0→i(σ2)
Theorem 2: If all algebras A1, A2, ..., Am are left-isotone, then
Conditions 1 and 2 guarantee the preservation of the left-isotonicity
property within and across the algebras, and thus guarantee path
optimality.
To prove the above result, we assume l ∈ L, and σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ
with σ1  σ2. There exists i, j, k ∈ [1,m] such that l ∈ Li,
σ1 ∈ Σj and σ2 ∈ Σk. We enumerate all possible cases (e.g.,
i = j = k, i = j 6= k, etc.), show that in each case, we have
l ⊕ σ1  l ⊕ σ2. The details are omitted for brevity.
We note that if an algebra (e.g., EIGRP) violates the sufficient
conditions and does not provide globally optimal paths [15], then
we cannot provide global optimal paths across the routing instances.
4.4 Conditions for link-state mode
Condition 3:
(a) ∀i ∈ [1,m], Φi→0 is bijective and Φ0→i = Φ−1i→0
(b) ∀i ∈ [1,m], Φi→0 is homomorphic, i.e., ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σi,
Φi→0(σ1 ⊕i σ2) = Φi→0(σ1)⊕0 Φi→0(σ2)
(c) ∀i ∈ [1,m], Φ0→i is homomorphic, i.e., ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ0,
Φ0→i(σ1 ⊕0 σ2) = Φ0→i(σ1)⊕i Φ0→i(σ2)
Proposition: If all algebras A0, A1, ..., Am are isotone, and for
every i in [1,m],⊕i is associative, then Conditions 1 to 3 guarantee
the isotonicity property across the algebras and the associativity of
⊕, and thus guarantee routing safety and path optimality.
To prove it, we assume σ1, σ2, σ3 ∈ Σ. There exists i, j, k ∈
[1,m] such that σ1 ∈ Σi, σ2 ∈ Σj and σ3 ∈ Σk. We enumerate
all possible cases (e.g., i = j = k, i = j 6= k, etc.), and show that
in each case, σ1  σ2 ⇒ σ1⊕σ3  σ2⊕ σ3, and (σ1 ⊕ σ2)⊕ σ3
= σ1 ⊕ (σ2 ⊕ σ3). Again, the details are omitted.
The above conditions imply the algebras to be isomorphic to be
connected in a link-state mode. It will be interesting to investigate
whether these conditions can be weakened. We leave it for future
work (Section 9).
4.5 Generalization to n-ary lexicographic
products
The framework naturally extends to the more general case of n-
ary lexicographic products of sub-algebras, by defining each Ai as
the lexicographical product of n unary routing algebras: ⊗(Ai1,
Ai2, . . ., Ain) [18]. Formally, the ranking procedure of n-ary lex-
icographic products is defined as: ∀ i ∈ [1,m], Ai = ⊗(Ai1, Ai2,
. . ., Ain) with ∀ i ∈ [1,m], ∀ d ∈ [1, n], Aid being an unary rout-
ing algebra (Lid,Σid,φid,⊕id, id), and the relation i over Σi is
defined as: ∀ α = (α1, α2, . . ., αn) ∈ Σi = (Σi1, Σi2, . . ., Σin),
∀ β = (β1, β2, . . ., βn) ∈ Σi = (Σi1, Σi2, . . ., Σin),
α i β⇔ ∃e ∈ [1, n], ∀d < e, αd ∼id βd and (αd ≺id βd or
(e = n and αn in βn)).
Section 3 defines a pair of conversion functions for each unary al-
gebra. In this case, n pairs of conversion functions must be defined
for Ai because each of its component Aid, d = 1, ..., n, requires a
pair: (1) Φid→0d: Σid → Σ0d, and (2) Φ0d→id: Σ0d → Σid.
We can prove that if each pair of conversion functions satisfies
Condition 1, and the collection of n sub-algebras satisfies the fol-
lowing condition, SM is preserved and thus, routing is safe across
the routing instances when route redistribution is performed in a
vectoring mode.
Condition 4: ∃e ∈ [1, n], ∀i ∈ [1,m], ∀d < e, Aid is either M or
SM, and Aie is SM.













(M) (M) (M) (SM) Dont care
5. DESIGN OF NEW PRIMITIVES
The theory presented in the previous two sections opens up new
design possibilities, including the creation of a new class of con-
necting primitives that inherently conforms to the identified safety
conditions. This section describes the details of one such design.
While we can formally establish that the new primitives guarantee
safety, the proof is omitted for space reasons.
5.1 Design considerations
Trading autonomy for expressiveness: This tradeoff is similar to
what has been discovered for BGP [11]. By resetting the metric of
a redistributed route in the new routing instance, the current design
offers a high degree of autonomy for the participating routing in-
stances. However, such metric reset results in a considerable loss
of information which prevents network operators from achieving
desirable design objectives. In this design, we choose conversion
functions strictly according to safety conditions, which will intro-
duce a strong dependency in the ranking of routes in different rout-
ing instances. The resulting solution is applicable to only networks
where the routing instances are managed by a single operator or a
team of cooperative operators. Many networks, including individ-
ual ISP networks, enterprise networks, campus networks, and mil-
itary networks, fall into this category. In fact, our design is more
desirable for such networks because it is more expressive and sup-
ports a large range of important operational goals, including those
not achievable today. We will substantiate this point in Section 7.
Designing for incremental deployment: To enable incremental
deployment, we target a design that requires no modification to ex-
isting routing protocols (e.g., BGP, EIGRP, OSPF, RIP, IS-IS). This
decision introduces some complications that constrain our design
space as follows. The theory assumes each routing protocol in-
stance to be correct and concentrates on the requirements for con-
version functions. As such, the theory requires each routing in-
stance to satisfy the safety conditions (as defined in Sections 3 and
4). However, there are two clear violations of such conditions by
current routing protocols.
First, OSPF External Type 2 routes do not comply with the SM
condition: As explained in Section 2, OSPF does not increase the
cost of an External Type 2 route while the route propagates. We
solve this problem by imposing the following OSPF-specific re-
striction on the design:
1. Routes redistributed into OSPF are always set to External Type 1.
Second, prior work [17] has shown that BGP is not SM but can
result in various routing instabilities. Making BGP compliant with
safety conditions is more difficult to achieve since even the first at-
tribute, local-preference, of the BGP route ranking criteria, is nei-
ther SM nor M. As such, BGP cannot be rendered safe by simply
discarding specific options. Instead, we impose the following BGP-
specific restrictions:
2. BGP routes are selected only if no route is offered by other pro-
tocols.
3. Routes from BGP cannot be redistributed into a non-BGP pro-
tocol instance.
These two restrictions enforce SM between non-BGP and BGP
instances, and ultimately guarantee correct routing so long as the
BGP configurations do not result in anomalies. Although the re-
strictions do not exist today, they do not prevent common design
objectives from being accomplished. The first restriction makes
BGP routes the least preferred routes. Indeed, when a router re-
ceives routes from both BGP and an IGP to a same destination
prefix, the router should typically prefer the more direct internal
route learned from the IGP over the external BGP route. This is
because sending traffic through external networks (e.g., providers)
can cost money. The question of whether the second restriction
would prevent existing design objectives from being achieved is a
more complicated one, and we defer the answer to Section 7.
Finally, we note that recent proposals [17] have suggested modi-
fications to BGP which would guarantee important properties (e.g.,
SM), while at the same time, still support existing policies (e.g.,
customer-provider, peering, and sibling relationships). The mod-
ifications if implemented would eliminate the need to treat BGP
separately.
5.2 Universal metric space
All non-BGP routing protocols (OSPF, IS-IS, RIP, EIGRP, static
routes) can be unified under the following 2-ary metric space: {type,
cost}. Derived from the theory, we make conversion functions an
explicit component of the design. We treat each non-BGP protocol
as a 2-ary algebra, where the first attribute is the route type and the
second attribute is the route cost. We define the following universal
metric space for the design of conversion functions:
1. Type: Σ0,1 = {A, B, C}. The universal domain for the type con-
sists of three permitted elements, and is totally ordered with type A
being preferred to type B which is in turn preferred to type C.
2. Cost: Σ0,2 = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 232 − 1}. The universal domain for
the cost metric consists of the set of integers from 1 to 232 − 1 and
is totally ordered by the arithmetic operator ≤.
5.3 New connecting primitives
When comparing routes received from different routing protocol
instances, our design maps the type and cost of each route into the
universal metric space according to the default conversion func-
tions shown in Table 22. It then ranks the routes based on their
ordering in the universal metric space. Since RIP does not define
a route type, all RIP routes are effectively of the same type “RIP”.
The same applies to static routes. The default conversion func-
tions for the cost dimension (e.g., x→ x8 for RIP) are designed to
scale the metric space (e.g., 4-bit for RIP) of each protocol to the
32-bit value range of the universal metric space. For example, an
2Details for IS-IS are omitted because of the protocol’s similarities
with OSPF. Prohibited signatures are not listed for brevity.
To universal domain From universal domainAttribute Protocol
Φprotocol→0 Φ0→protocol
intra-area→ A *→ external type 1
OSPF inter-area→ B
external type 1→ C
Type RIP RIP→ C *→ RIP
internal→ B *→ externalEIGRP
external→ C
Static static→ C NA
OSPF x→ x2 x→ ceiling(√x)
Cost RIP x→ x8 x→ ceiling( 8√x)
EIGRP x→ x x→ ceiling(x)
Static x→ x NA
Table 2: Default conversion functions. The symbol “*” repre-
sents any permitted value.
OSPF route of type “intra-area” and cost “30” would be mapped
into type “A” and cost “900” in the universal metric space. Simi-
larly, an EIGRP route of type “internal” and metric “65345” would
be mapped into type “B” and cost “65345”. Since type A routes are
preferred over type B routes, the OSPF route would be preferred.
The conversion functions in the other direction (i.e., from uni-
versal metric space to a protocol specific metric space) are needed
for route redistribution. For example, let us assume that the OSPF
route in the example above is being redistributed into RIP. It would
be given a RIP hop-count of 3 because ceiling( 8√900) = 3.
It is straightforward to show that the default conversion functions
comply with the identified safety conditions. As discussed in Sec-
tion 7, these functions are sufficient for most of today’s operational
goals. Network operators may customize the conversion functions
based on operational objectives subject to these constraints: (i) the
new conversion functions comply with the safety conditions as de-
fined in Section 4, and (ii) two routing processes at border routers
must be configured with the same conversion functions if they be-
long to the same routing instance.
New route selection procedure: Like before, each routing pro-
cess first determines a best route within its own RIB. For example,
among all the received BGP routes, the BGP best path selection
algorithm would choose a single most preferred BGP route. We
note that currently, routers can run at most one instance of RIP and
BGP but can run multiple processes of OSPF and EIGRP. Conse-
quently, after each routing process has determined its best route,
a router obtains at most one BGP route, but may receive multiple
OSPF routes, each from a different OSPF process. To select one
among them for the Forwarding Information Base (FIB), a router
applies the following ranking rules in our design:
Step 1. Protocol: Prefer non-BGP (i.e., EIGRP, OSPF, RIP, static)
routes to BGP route.
Step 2. Type: If multiple non-BGP routes are available, prefer
type A routes, then type B routes, and type C last.
Step 3. Cost: Among non-BGP routes of the preferred route type,
prefer the route with the lowest cost.
If only one route is in consideration and is from BGP, the process
stops after rule 1 and selects the BGP route. Otherwise, it follows
the ordering in the 2-ary universal space. Again, step 1 of the pro-
posed route selection procedure is created to handle the special case
of BGP and to enforce the previous restrictions. Similarly, the fol-
lowing route redistribution procedure treats BGP differently.
New route redistribution procedure: The theory allows the re-
distribution to be performed in either a vectoring or a link-state
manner. In this design, for brevity, we restrict route redistribution
to the vectoring mode.
For redistribution between non-BGP instances (e.g., from OSPF
into RIP), the metrics of the redistributed routes are decided by the
conversion functions.
We disallow any redistribution from BGP into a non-BGP proto-
col instance as part of the BGP-specific restrictions defined in the
beginning of this section. We allow great flexibility for redistribu-
tion into BGP since this is not part of the BGP-specific restrictions.
When a route is redistributed into BGP, its BGP attributes (e.g., lo-
cal preference, AS-PATH, MED, community, etc.) can be set to
any value as long as they do not cause routing anomalies within
BGP. This flexibility allows the new primitives to preserve the cur-
rent levels of autonomy, expressiveness and privacy between BGP
networks. Any policy (e.g., customer, provider, peer relationships)
currently implemented between BGP networks can still be accom-
plished. In addition, networks administered by different authorities
and connected through BGP do not need to share more information
than today. In particular, they do not need to exchange information
on the conversion functions.
6. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented the new connecting primitives into the
XORP [3] routing software, version 1.6. Default conversion func-
tions are exactly as defined in Section 5. It is straightforward to
configure the new primitives because they primarily have a single
tuning knob: the option to customize the conversion functions.
Custom conversion functions can be specified either in a static
configuration file – which is loaded at XORP startup time – or dy-
namically through the XORP command line interface. They are








The system verifies that the definitions comply with the sufficient
conditions for safety before accepting them.
For the cost dimension, the conversion functions from a routing
protocol specific metric (e.g., RIP hop-count) to the universal space
are restricted to the form of “a × xn + b” (with a, n, and b being
integer parameters), and the conversion functions in the other di-
rection are simply the inverse. This restriction facilitates a straight-
forward algorithm to verify that the conversion functions comply
with the desired conditions, while still enabling a wide range of
operational goals, as illustrated in the next section. In future work,
we will attempt to understand the full implication of this restriction
and explore other forms of conversion functions.
It should be noted that neither EIGRP nor IS-IS is part of the
implementation. EIGRP is a CISCO proprietary protocol and not
supported by XORP. The XORP community has plans to add IS-IS
to XORP but it is yet to be accomplished as of version 1.6.
3The syntax is similar to that of JUNOS. We note that an imple-
mentation in a Cisco IOS like environment would also be straight-
forward: Replace the existing distance and default-metric com-
mands with a couple of new commands for customizing the con-
version functions, and modify the redistribute command to remove













Figure 9: Illustration of domain backup.
7. VALIDATION OF EXPRESSIVENESS
We define expressiveness broadly as the ability of the primitives
to support operational goals. In the section, we consider five oper-
ational objectives. The first three are regarded important require-
ments by operators [21], and we have conducted validation experi-
ments with our XORP implementation for each of them. The fourth
objective addresses the implications of the three restrictions intro-
duced in Section 5.1 on the expressiveness of our design. Finally,
the last objective illustrates the flexibility with which one can de-
rive connecting primitives from the proposed theory.
In a related note, as explained in the last paragraph of Section 5,
our design preserves the current levels of autonomy, privacy and
expressiveness between BGP networks.
7.1 Domain backup
Domain backup designates the ability for a network to preserve
reachability even in the event of a routing instance partition, through
alternate physical paths traversing other routing instances. To il-
lustrate the property, consider the network from Figure 9. It con-
sists of two office branches, each running its own routing instance
(RIP, OSPF). In the failure of router C, link A-C, or link B-C, the
routers D and E can no longer directly communicate despite the
existence of a physical path (D-A-B-E) between the two routers.
By default, the path D-A-B-E is not offered as it traverses a dif-
ferent routing instance (RIP). To make this path available, mutual
route redistribution should be enabled between OSPF and RIP at
the border routers B and A, respectively. However, route redis-
tribution at multiple points can easily result in routing anomalies
[8]. Hence, to support domain backup, current route redistribution
solutions require specific physical topologies and complex policies
[21]: The routing instances must be connected in a star topology,
and domain backup is provided only to the leaf routing instances.
In contrast, the new primitives can offer domain backup to ev-
ery routing instance with no restriction on physical topology. We
implemented the network in Figure 9. The border routers A and
B perform mutual route redistribution between the RIP and OSPF
instances, with the default conversion functions. We observed that,
in the absence of failure, E receives two paths to D: E-B-C-A-D
and E-B-A-D. E selects the first path to forward traffic to D as
it is an intra route (type A in the universal metric space) whereas
the other route is external (type C). Then, we simulated a failure of
router C, link A-C, or link B-C. Despite the partition, routers E
and D still preserved their connectivity through the path E-B-A-
D.
7.2 Router-level shortest path routing across
IGP instances
Router-level shortest path routing across IGP instances desig-
nates the ability for a pair of end hosts in different IGP instances to
route traffic to each other along the shortest path. Today, this prop-
erty is supported but only between OSPF instances. IOS provides












    f_rip_to_universal_metric_a: 1600
    f_rip_to_universal_metric_n: 1
    f_ospf_to_universal_metric_n: 1
}
policy {
    f_rip_to_universal_metric_a: 1600
    f_rip_to_universal_metric_n: 1
    f_ospf_to_universal_metric_n: 1
}
Figure 10: Illustration of router-level shortest path routing
across OSPF and RIP instances.
OSPF instance into another OSPF instance. However, the current
primitives do not permit router-level shortest path routing between
two instances of different protocol types (e.g., OSPF and RIP). In
such a setting, the cost of a redistributed route is set to a value with
no relation to the cost of the initial route. The cost information to
the destination is therefore lost at the first redistribution point. Even
when redistributing between OSPF instances, the existing proce-
dure has the following additional limitation. When a route from an
OSPF instance is redistributed into a different OSPF instance , the
cost can only be set to either an arbitrary value that is independent
from the initial cost, or its original value. The current route redis-
tribution procedure does not permit the cost of redistributed routes
to be modified between the instances through a function. How-
ever, operational networks may rely on the OSPF cost to reflect the
physical distance between routers. When different units are used in
each instance (e.g., miles versus meters), router-level shortest path
routing is not possible.
In contrast, with the new design, operators can specify their own
conversion functions. The new primitives enable router-level short-
est path routing between any pair of IGP instances. We imple-
mented the network of Figure 10. It consists of two routing protocol
instances: OSPF and RIP. Their routing metrics represent the phys-
ical distance in different units (e.g., meters and miles, respectively.)
The described conversion functions at the border routers (B, D) al-
low geographical shortest path routing across the instances, despite
the usage of different units in each domain. We modified the costs
of the different links, and the shortest path (e.g., between A and C)
was consistently selected.
7.3 Traffic engineering
Current traffic engineering techniques are only applicable within
one IGP routing protocol instance [12] or between BGP domains
[26]. Our primitives, with their support for router level shortest
path routing, naturally extends traffic engineering across multiple
routing instances without requiring any additional coordination be-
tween the instances.
To illustrate the existing limitations and newly supported capa-
bilities, consider the example network depicted in Figure 11. The
network is composed of three routing protocol instances (OSPF
10, RIP, OSPF 20). Network operators frequently adjust the IGP
weights to minimize congestion. The adjustments of IGP weights
aim at redirecting traffic over less congested links. However, this
technique is currently applicable only within a single routing pro-



















Figure 11: Illustration of traffic engineering across routing pro-
tocol instances.
weight is therefore increased to a larger value. The goal is for
senders (e.g., S) to select the less resource constrained paths (e.g.,
S-X-Y -Z-D). However, because redistributed routes are assigned
a static metric values (e.g., at B, Y , A and X), the initial weight
information is lost and senders may still select the congested paths
(e.g., S-A-B-C-D). Although the metrics of redistributed routes
could be updated at the border routers B and Y in times of con-
gestion, the operators of OSPF 10 may have no control over the
border routers A and X . As a consequence, congestion cannot be
minimized across multiple routing instances. In comparison, our
implementation eliminates this limitation.
We implemented the network in Figure 11. We did not modify
the default conversions at the border routers. We observed that with
the cost of B-C set to 50, S received two paths to D: D-C-B-A-S
with a cost of 276, and D-Z-Y -X-S with a cost of 655. Because
of its lower cost, S selected the first path to forward traffic to D.
Then, after increasing the cost of B-C to 400, the cost of the route
redistributed by A into OSPF was updated to 1296. Consequently,
S switched to the second path to forward its traffic to D.
7.4 Virtual private networks
Section 5.1 introduces a limitation to BGP: Routes cannot be re-
distributed from BGP into an IGP. An important question that nat-
urally ensues is: Does this new restriction prevent existing design
objectives from being achieved?
Empirical studies [21] have revealed that network often inject
routes from BGP into an IGP, especially in VPN deployments. As
illustrated in Figure 12, a company (e.g., XYZ) may have multiple
sites (e.g., Site 1, Site 2) with their own routing protocol (e.g., RIP,
OSPF). To allow connectivity between the sites, the company relies
on a service provider backbone. Routes from one site (e.g., OSPF
routes from Site 1) are first redistributed into the backbone (i.e.,
BGP cloud) at an provider edge (PE) router (e.g., PE 1). The routes
are propagated through the BGP backbone, and then redistributed
from BGP into the IGP of each remote site (e.g., RIP from Site 2)
at the connecting PEs (e.g., PE 2).
The fact that the new primitives prevent this type of redistribution
may therefore be a serious impediment to its adoption. However,
it turns out that the same objective can readily be achieved without
any redistribution from BGP into IGP. For simple scenarios, a cus-
tomer edge (CE) router (e.g., CE 1) can originate a default route in
the respective site’s IGP (e.g., Site 1’s OSPF), and be configured
with a static route pointing to the connecting PE (e.g., PE 1) for
the default route (0.0.0.0/0). As an alternative, BGP can also be
deployed in the company’s sites. Then, operators simply need to
redistribute the IGP routes into BGP at each site, and control the
route propagation through BGP policies. In future work, we will
seek to further understand the full impact of the OSPF and BGP
restrictions stipulated in our design on network operations.
7.5 Strict preference policy
The current route selection allows routers to strictly prefer routes












Figure 12: Illustration of typical VPN scenario.
To universal domain From universal domainAttribute Protocol
Φprotocol→0 Φ0→protocol
OSPF OSPF→ 254 *→ OSPF
Protocol RIP RIP→ 254 *→ RIP
EIGRP EIGRP→ 254 *→ EIGRP
static static→ 254 NA
Table 3: Additional default conversion functions for the new
protocol attribute.
routes to RIP routes”. This type of policy might be useful to im-
plement blackholes (e.g., in the event of DDoS). This section il-
lustrates how our design can be extended to support such strict
preference policy. Every non-BGP routing protocol instance is
modeled as a 3-ary routing algebra: {protocol, type, cost}. The
new protocol attribute is first considered when comparing non-BGP
routes. Its has an integer range from 1 to 255 in the universal met-
ric space, with 255 corresponding to the prohibited path. EIGRP,
OSPF, RIP and static routes are defined to be of protocol type
“EIGRP”, “OSPF”, “RIP” and “static”, respectively. Table 3 presents
the additional default conversion functions. All protocols are equally
preferred by default. This design extension supports strict prefer-
ence policies in addition to the previously presented objectives. To
specify a strict preference for a protocol instance, simply override
that instance’s conversion function in the protocol dimension at all
its border routers, e.g., from “OSPF→ 254” to “OSPF→ 10”. Do-
ing so will not result in routing anomalies as long as the new set of
conversion functions conform to Condition 1.
8. RELATED WORK
A large body of work exists on the correctness of routing. How-
ever, most of prior work considered a specific protocol at a time.
For RIP, the focus was on solving the “count to infinity” prob-
lem. For OSPF, special attention was given to its stability issues
[4, 27]. For BGP, various causes for potential routing anomalies
have been identified, followed by the development of thorough an-
alytical models and solutions. The insights gained from these ef-
forts led researchers to explore design principles towards the cre-
ation of a safer inter-domain protocol [16, 19, 10, 11] and more
abstractly, develop unifying algebraic frameworks identifying fun-
damental properties a vector or link-state routing protocol must sat-
isfy to ensure correct behaviors [29, 17]. In fact, prior to these
results, researchers had already started adopting an algebraic ap-
proach to routing [7, 13, 14]. However, these algebraic structures
may abstract away too many routing protocol specific dynamics
and some possess properties that are not realistic for contemporary
routing protocols. For example, neither IGRP nor BGP satisfies the
distributivity property required by dioids.
For routing across multiple routing protocol instances, several
analytical models were recently introduced [22, 23], enabling a rig-
orous analysis of the current design of connecting primitives and
exposing its deficiencies. These models also made the formula-
tion of practical configuration guidelines possible [20]. However,
this approach is inherently backward-looking. The models only
apply to existing solutions, and the derived guidelines further re-
strict the expressiveness of the already rigid current primitives. Re-
cently, two researchers [6] have proposed a new algebraic approach
based on idempotent semirings to model routing, including the case
across multiple routing instances. While the approach is general
and promising, it models only route redistribution, not AD, nor the
interaction of route redistribution and AD, which was left as fu-
ture work. The closest related work to our proposal is the “metric
transformations” introduced by Mills and Braun in 1987 [25]. This
concept is similar to our notion of “conversion functions” as it per-
mits to exchange routes between routing instances and derive the
metric of the newly redistributed routes. Understandably, Mills and
Braun focused on routing protocols with only a single metric (e.g.,
RIP) and with a distance vector mode of computation between the
routing instances. In comparison, our formal framework applies to
routing protocols with multiple criteria, allows a link-state mode of
redistribution across the routing instances, and identifies sufficient
conditions for routing safety and optimal paths.
9. DISCUSSION
Several important questions still need to be investigated. On the
theory front, can we find safety conditions without requiring all
border routers of the same routing instance to use identical conver-
sion functions? As the fine-grained effects of different path compu-
tation algorithms on routing correctness are better understood [30],
can we weaken the sufficient conditions for the conversion func-
tions? In addition, we note that while the notion of conversion
functions is general and can model the existing mechanisms, our
theory concentrates on routing protocols that rank routes based on
a lexical product of multiple attributes. All existing routing pro-
tocols indeed fall into this category. However, should new routing
protocols with different ways of ranking routes emerge, new suffi-
cient conditions may need to be derived. On the design front, there
may be important operational requirements that are little known
outside the selected operational communities. How do we collect
them if this is indeed the case? Furthermore, how can we anticipate
requirements that may arise in the future?
10. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new theory to reason about the safety of
routing across multiple routing instances. In addition, we iden-
tify as set of conditions for the connecting primitives to guarantee
correct routing and optimal paths. The second part of the paper
describes an application of the theory to create a new set of con-
necting primitives that are much safer and more flexible than the
currently deployed version. We assumed no changes to the speci-
fications of the existing routing protocols, and we demonstrate that
with very minimum changes to how they should be configured, the
new primitives can not only support existing operational objectives
but also enable new functions that are important but not feasible
today, all the while guaranteeing routing safety. In the big picture,
our effort can be viewed as another example that underscores the
importance and feasibility of principled design, which we believe
can help all phases of network operations.
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